We develop a semantic framework that extends first-order logic by literal projection and a novel second semantically defined operator, raising, which is only slightly different from literal projection and can be used to define a generalization of parallel circumscription with varied predicates in a straightforward and compact way. We call this variant of circumscription scopedetermined, since like literal projection and raising its effects are controlled by a so-called scope, that is, a set of literals, as parameter. We work out formally a toolkit of propositions about projection, raising and circumscription and their interaction. It reveals some refinements of and new views on previously known properties. In particular, we apply it to show that wellfoundedness with respect to circumscription can be expressed in terms of projection, and that a characterization of the consequences of circumscribed propositional formulas in terms of literal projection can be generalized to first-order logic and expressed compactly in terms of new variants of the strongest necessary and weakest sufficient condition.
Introduction
First-order logic provides a well-researched, quite general, and to some degree mechanizable framework for formalizing knowledge. However, for many tasks in knowledge representation it is difficult, if not impossible, to formalize the involved knowledge purely in first-order logic. One way out is to move on to special logics for knowledge representation, another way is to consider slight extensions of first-order logic that are powerful enough to express many concepts of knowledge representation. The problem addressed in the paper is to investigate some extensions of this kind, in particular variants of second-order quantification and circumscription.
The problem is primarily important because slightly extended first-order logic has the potential of being the foundation for a single knowledge representation system that provides different knowledge representation techniques in a unified way. This integration on the system level stems from the integration on the "theoretical" semantic framework level, which in turn could benefit from support by mechanized reasoning in the long run.
Work that has been done on the problem includes especially the development of circumscription (McCarthy, 1980) , a semantically founded approach to non-monotonic reasoning that was devised as an add-on to first-order logic for knowledge representation. Properties and variants of circumscription have been investigated, e.g. in (Lifschitz, 1994 (Lifschitz, , 1986 . The expression of circumscription in terms of second-order quantification, and the corresponding processing by second-order quantifier elimination has been worked out (Doherty et al., 1997) . Second-order quantifier elimination can also express further knowledge representation techniques such as abduction and modularization of knowledge bases (Gabbay et al., 2008) . Variants of second-order quantifier elimination appear in the literature under different names such as computation of uniform interpolants, forgetting, and projection. Restricted to propositional formulas, it is called elimination of quantified Boolean variables. Our work is based on a particular variant of second-order quantification, literal projection, which permits, so to speak, to quantify upon an arbitrary set of ground literals, instead of just (all ground literals with) a given predicate. Literal projection allows, for example, to express predicate quantification upon a predicate just in positive or negative polarity. Eliminating such a quantifier from a formula in negation normal form results in a formula that might still contain the quantified predicate, but only in literals whose polarity is complementary to the quantified one. Literal projection has been specified originally for propositional logic (Lang et al., 2003) in its variant literal forgetting. This characterization has been reformulated in a more accessible way and generalized to first-order logic (Wernhard, 2008) . Some relationships between literal projection and circumscription have been investigated for propositional logic (Lang et al., 2003) .
The main contribution of the paper is a semantic framework that extends first-order logic by two semantically defined primitive operators, for literal projection, which we also call briefly projection from now on, and for raising. The latter is only slightly different from projection and can be applied to express the constraints imposed by circumscription to the models of the circumscribed formula. With these primitives, further operators are defined in compact ways, in particular for a generalization of parallel predicate circumscription with varied predicates, and for new variants of the strongest necessary and weakest sufficient condition (Lin, 2001; Doherty et al., 2001) .
We call the variant of circumscription that is defined in terms of raising scope-determined, since like projection and raising its effects are controlled by a so-called scope, that is, a set of ground literals, as parameter. In the paper, a toolkit of propositions about projection, raising and circumscription and their interaction is presented. It reveals some refinements of and new views on previously known properties. In particular, a characterization of well-foundedness with respect to circumscription (Lifschitz, 1994) in terms of projection, and a characterization of consequences of circumscribed formulas (Lang et al., 2003) adapted to first-order logic and expressed compactly in terms of variants of the strongest necessary and weakest sufficient condition.
The toolkit of definitions and propositions provides a basis for formalizing applications that involve the interaction of projection and circumscription. It has been used in (Wernhard, 2010a) to characterize different established semantics for logic programming. An envisaged application area is the development of variants of such semantics to model human reasoning according to the approach of (Stenning and van Lambalgen, 2008; Hölldobler et al., 2011) .
The originality of the contribution of the paper stems from two main novelties: First, the observation that circumscription can be characterized with raising whose semantic definition can be obtained from that of literal projection just by replacing a subset symbol with strict subset. Second, the idea to use scopes, sets of literals, as uniform parameters to control the effects of projection as well as circumscription.
The contribution is non-trivial in particular since it takes over the work of shifting the semantic operation of circumscription and projection, which is sometimes hard on the edge of intuition, to representations that are relatively easy to manipulate at the symbolic level, basically subset relationships between sets of literals. The contribution strives for simplicity and general applicability by consequently focusing on "semantic operators", operators that have equivalent values for equivalent argument formulas, as far as possible.
The paper is structured as follows: Notation and preliminaries are given in Section 2. In Section 3 the concept of scope is introduced and background material on projection is provided. Section 4 is about scope-determined circumscription: The underlying raising operator is introduced (Section 4.1), the relationship of scope-determined circumscription to the traditional specification of predicate circumscription is shown (Section 4.2), and properties of scope-determined circumscription are developed, basic properties (Section 4.3) and properties that concern the interplay with projection (Sections 4.4 and 4.5). Variants of strongest necessary and weakest sufficient condition are introduced in Section 4.6 and applied to characterize consequences of circumscriptions in Section 4.7. Section 4.8 concludes Section 4 with a summary table of the propositions developed in its subsections. The conclusion (Section 5) is followed by an appendix with proofs of the propositions stated in Section 4.7.
Some of the material in this paper has been previously presented at the 7th International Workshop on First-Order Theorem Proving, FTP'09 (Wernhard, 2010b) .
Notation and Preliminaries

Symbolic Notation
We use the following symbols, also with sub-and superscripts, to stand for items of types as indicated in the following table (precise definitions of the types are given later on), considered implicitly as universally quantified in definition and proposition statements:
We write the positive (negative, resp.) literal with atom A as +A (−A, resp.). We say that +A (−A, resp.) has positive (negative, resp.) polarity. The complement of literal L is written L. The set of complements of a set S of literals, that is, {L|L ∈ S}, is written S. I, β |= .
I, β |= ⊥.
I, β |= ¬F iff def I, β |= F .
I, β |= F1 ∧ F2 iff def I, β |= F1 and I, β |= F2.
I, β |= F1 ∨ F2 iff def I, β |= F1 or I, β |= F2.
I, β |= ∀x F iff def for all t ∈ TERMS it holds that I, β t x |= F . I, β |= ∃x F iff def there exists a t ∈ TERMS such that I, β t x |= F .
In writing sets of literals we use the following shorthands: A predicate symbol stands for the set of all ground literals with that symbol as predicate. A set or tuple of predicate symbols stands for the set of all ground literals whose predicate is a member of the set or tuple, respectively.
We assume a fixed first-order signature with at least one constant. The sets of all ground terms, all ground literals, all positive ground literals, and all negative ground literals -with respect to this signature -are denoted by TERMS, ALL, POS, NEG, respectively. Variables are x, y, z, also with subscripts.
Plain Formulas
We assume that a formula is constructed from first-order literals and the logic operators shown in the left column of Table 1 (p. 4). Later on we extend the notion of formula by two additional operators, for projection and raising, that go beyond first-order logic. To distinguish formulas without these operators, we call them plain formulas.
As meta-level notation with respect to this syntax, we use versions of the binary connectives with arbitrary integers ≥ 0 as arity, implication (→), converse implication (←), equivalence (↔), writing positive literals in formulas just as atoms, sequences of variables as quantifier arguments, and omitting of universal quantifiers. A sentence is a formula without free variables.
Semantic Framework
We use a notational variant of the framework of Herbrand interpretations: An interpretation is a pair I, β , where I is a structure, that is, a set of ground literals that contains for all ground atoms A exactly one of +A or −A, and β is a variable assignment, that is, a mapping of the set of variables into TERMS. Formula F with all free variables replaced by their image in β is denoted by Fβ; the variable assignment that maps x to ground term t and all other variables to the same values as β is denoted by β t x . The satisfaction relation between interpretations and formulas is defined by the clauses in Table 1 , where L matches a literal, and F, F 1 , F 2 a formula. A formula F is called satisfiable if and only if there exists an interpretation I, β such that I, β |= F . Entailment and equivalence are straightforwardly defined in terms of the satisfaction relation. Entailment: F 1 |= F 2 holds if and only if for all I, β such that I, β |= F 1 it holds that I, β |= F 2 . Equivalence: F 1 ≡ F 2 if and only if F 1 |= F 2 and F 2 |= F 1 .
Relation to Conventional Model Theory
The motivation for using sets of ground literals as the structure component of interpretations is that this facilitates the characterization of the extensions of first-order logic to be discussed in the subsequent sections. Relevant properties of structures can be expressed in a streamlined way as relationships of sets. However, interpretations according to our semantic framework can be just considered as a particular representation of interpretations as conventionally used in model theory: The set of literals I in an interpretation I, β is called "structure", since it represents a Herbrand structure. The domain is the set of ground terms. Function symbols f with arity n ≥ 0 are mapped to functions f such that for all ground terms t 1 , ..., t n it holds that f (t 1 , ..., t n ) = f (t 1 , ..., t n ). Predicate symbols p with arity n ≥ 0 are mapped to { t 1 , ..., t n | +p(t 1 , ..., t n ) ∈ I}. (We speak here explicitly of function symbols and predicate symbols, which we call in the other sections also briefly functions and predicates.) Moreover, an interpretation I, β represents a conventional second-order interpretation (Ebbinghaus et al., 1984) (if predicate variables are considered as distinguished predicate symbols): The structure in the conventional sense corresponds to I, as described above, except that mappings of predicate variables are omitted. The assignment is β, extended such that all predicate variables p are mapped to { t 1 , ..., t n | +p(t 1 , ..., t n ) ∈ I}.
Scopes and Projection
Scopes
As already indicated, we will extend the notion of formula by two further primitive operators that go beyond first-order logic: project S (F ) for projection and raise S (F ) for raising. The arguments of both operators are a formula F and, written as subscript, a specifier of a set S of ground literals. We call a set of ground literals in the role as argument to these operators a scope. Projection and raising are then parametrized in the same way, with scopes providing a uniform interface for combining these operators and further operators defined in terms of them, like circumscription, as we will see later on. Scopes control the precise effects of operators with a granularity that goes down to the level of single ground literals: Effects on a whole predicate can be expressed with scopes that contain all or none of the ground literals with the predicate; effects on a specific ground atom can be expressed with the two-element set of its positive and negative literal; and effects that differ depending on the polarity in which atoms occur in the argument formula can be expressed by having just positive or negative literals in the scope.
We do not define here a concrete syntax for scope specifiers as formula constituents and just speak of a scope, referring to the actual scope in a semantic context as well as some expression that denotes it in a syntactic context. When writing scopes we make use of the shorthands specified in Section 2.1 for sets of literals.
Projection
The first of the two primitive operators by which we extend first-order logic is projection. Each of the standard operators for first-order logic has been semantically defined by a clause in Table 1 . The semantic definition of projection provides such a clause for the projection operator:
Definition 1 (Projection). The projection of formula F onto scope S, in symbols project S (F ), is a formula whose semantics is defined by
Forgetting is a notational variant of projection, where the scope is considered complementary. We define it here not as a primitive but in terms of projection:
Definition 2 (Forgetting). The forgetting in formula F about scope S is defined as
Combined with propositional logic, projection generalizes Boolean quantification, combined with first-order logic second-order quantification: The second-order formula ∃p F , where p is a predicate symbol, can be expressed as projection of F onto the set of all ground literals with a predicate other than p, or equivalently, as the forgetting about the set of all ground literals with predicate p. Intuitively, the projection of a formula F onto scope S is a formula that expresses about literals in S the same as F , but expresses nothing about other literals. A projection of a plain propositional formula is equivalent to a plain propositional formula in negation normal form in which only literals in the projection scope do occur. Such a sentence is a uniform interpolant of the formula with respect to the scope. A naive way to construct such a sentence is indicated by the following equivalences, which hold for propositional formulas F and atoms A, where
, resp.) denotes F with all occurrences of atom A replaced by (⊥, resp.):
The particular variants of projection and forgetting that we use are literal projection and literal forgetting (Wernhard, 2008; Lang et al., 2003) , which allow, so-to-speak, to express quantification upon just the positive or negative occurrences of a predicate in a formula. They can be contrasted with atom projection and atom forgetting, respectively, where the polarity of the scope members is not taken into account.
Atom projection and atom forgetting can be defined as special cases of literal projection and literal forgetting, respectively, where the scope is constrained to be an atom scope, that is, containing the same atoms in positive as well as negative polarity:
Definition 3 (Atom Scope). A scope S such that S = S is called an atom scope.
If S is an atom scope, the condition J ∩ S ⊆ I in the semantic definition of project just expresses that structures I and J are required to be equal as far as members of S are considered, but are unrelated otherwise:
An example for atom projection is given with Example 5.i below. If S is not constrained to be an atom scope, the condition J ∩ S ⊆ I encodes a different effect on literals depending on whether they are positive or negative, as illustrated for q in Example 5.ii-5.v.
Some of the properties of projection that we list in the proposition below involve the literal base of a plain formula, as we call the set of ground instances of the literals that "occur" in the formula. This is one of the few "syntactic" operators, that is, operators whose value might differ for equivalent formulas, which we will use. A related concept that is independent of syntactic properties, the essential literal base, is discussed in relation to projection in (Wernhard, 2008 (Wernhard, , 2009a . Literal base is formally defined as follows:
The following proposition gives an overview on properties of projection. Most of them follow straightforwardly from the semantic definition of project. Proofs, as well as more thorough material on projection can be found in (Wernhard, 2008 (Wernhard, , 2009a .
Proposition 7 (Properties of Projection).
Basic Properties
Interplay with the Literal Base
Interplay with Other Operators
Scope-Determined Circumscription
The Raising Operator
The operator raise is, aside of project, the other "nonstandard" primitive by which we extend first-order logic. Analogously to projection it is semantically defined by a clause following the pattern in Table 1 for the first-order operators:
Definition 8 (Raising). The raising of formula F onto scope S, in symbols raise S (F ), is a formula whose semantics is defined by I, β |= raise S (F ) iff def there exists a J such that J, β |= F and J ∩ S ⊂ I ∩ S.
When negated, the raise operator expresses the requirements that are additionally imposed by circumscription to the models of the circumscribed formula. Accordingly, we define a variant of predicate circumscription, scope-determined circumscription, in terms of raise:
Definition 9 (Scope-Determined Circumscription). The scope-determined circumscription of formula F onto scope S, in symbols circ S (F ), is defined as
We will take a closer look on scope-determined circumscription in subsequent sections, and proceed for now with considering raise as an operator on its own. The semantic definitions of raise (Definition 8) and project (Definition 1) are very similar: The condition J ∩ S ⊆ I in the definition of project is equivalent to J ∩ S ⊆ I ∩ S. Just by replacing the subset relation (⊆) with strict subset (⊂), the definition of raise is obtained. The name raising refers to the requirement of the existence of a "lower" interpretation imposed by raise: An interpretation I, β is a model of raise S (F ) if and only if there exists another interpretation J, β which is a model of F and is strictly "lower" than I, β in the sense that J ∩ S ⊂ I ∩ S. In the definition of circumscription the raise operator occurs negated, thus ensuring that only "lowest" interpretations are models of a circumscription.
An alternate semantic characterization of raise provides further intuitive insight into its effect: A scope can be partitioned into two disjoint subsets which we call biscope and uniscope. The first contains those members of the scope whose complement is also a member of the scope (thus they are "bi-polar" members). The latter contains the remaining members of the scope, that is, those whose complement is not also a member of the scope (thus they are "uni-polar" members). The following definition provides formal notation for partitioning a scope in this way:
Definition 10 (Biscope and Uniscope Partitions of a Scope).
The semantic characterization of raise in the following proposition is like Definition 8, except that the condition J ∩S ⊂ I ∩S is replaced by a condition that reveals the different effects of raise on members of the biscope and uniscope partitions of the raising scope: With respect to the biscope the structure J must be identical to I, and with respect to the uniscope it must be a strict subset of I.
Proposition 11 (Raising in Terms of Biscopes and Uniscopes).
I, β |= raise S (F ) if and only if there exists a J such that (1) J, β |= F , (2) J ∩ biscope(S) = I ∩ biscope(S), and (3) J ∩ uniscope(S) ⊂ I ∩ uniscope(S).
The following example shows the effect of raising for the same formula and scopes as Example 5 for projection:
Example 12 (Raising). As in Example 5, let
(ii) raise {+p,−p,+q,+r,−r} (F ) ≡ −p ∧ +q.
(iii) raise {+p,−p,−q,+r,−r} (F ) ≡ −q ∧ +r.
Properties of raising are compiled in the following proposition:
Proposition 13 (Properties of Raising).
Basic Properties
(iii) If S 1 ⊇ S 2 and uniscope(S 1 ) ⊆ uniscope(S 2 ), then raise S1 (F ) |= raise S2 (F ).
(iv) If S = S, then raise S (F ) ≡ ⊥.
Interplay with Projection
Raising is monotonic (Prop. 13.i), like projection (Prop. 7.ii). From monotonicity follows that raise is a "semantic operator" in the sense that for equivalent argument formulas its values are also equivalent (Prop. 13.ii, analogous to Prop. 7.iii for project). A projection entails the projection onto a subset scope (Prop. 7.iv). The analog holds for raising with the additional precondition that the uniscope of the subset scope is a superset of the first scope (Prop. 13.iii). The raising onto an atom scope, or equivalently onto a scope with empty uniscope, is inconsistent (Prop. 13.iv).
Raising distributes over disjunction (Prop. 13.v), like projection (Prop. 7.xvi). The raising of a conjunction entails the raisings of its conjuncts (Prop. 13.vi), which follows from monotonicity and holds analogously also for projection (Prop. 7.xvii).
That raising entails projection (Prop. 13.vii) follows immediately from their semantic definitions. Proposition 13.viii is a stronger statement which shows that raising can be applied together with atom projection to characterize literal projection. Nestings of alternating applications of projection and raising onto the same scope collapse into just raising, since a raising does only express knowledge about the raising scope (Prop. 13.ix) and only the knowledge that a formula expresses about the raising scope is relevant for raising (Prop. 13.x). Proposition 13.xi underlies properties of circumscription discussed later on, specifically Prop. 18.iii and 18.iv.
Generalizing Predicate Circumscription
The scope-determined circumscription circ S (F ) of a formula F onto scope S has been defined in terms of the raise operator in Definition 9. It expresses a generalization of predicate circumscription (McCarthy, 1980) . The attribute scope-determined indicates that a scope, that is, a set of ground literals, is used to determine what is circumscribed. If F is a plain sentence over disjoint sets of predicates P , Q and Z, then the parallel predicate circumscription of P in F with fixed Q and varied Z (Lifschitz, 1994) , traditionally written CIRC[F ; P ; Z], can be expressed as circ (P ∩POS)∪Q (F ). Recall that in specifications of scopes we let a set of predicates stand for the set of all ground instances of literals whose predicate is in the set (see Section 2.1). The scope (P ∩ POS) ∪ Q thus is the set of (1) all positive ground literals with a circumscribed predicate, and (2) all ground literals with a fixed predicate.
Scope-determined circumscription is more general than parallel predicate circumscription: Since a scope is an arbitrary set of ground literals, with scope-determined circumscription it is possible to express minimization, maximization and variation conditions that apply only to a subset of the instances of a predicate. The set of those ground instances of a predicate that are just positively in the circumscription scope forms the set of minimized instances of the predicate. Symmetrically, the instances that are just negatively in the scope form the set of maximized instances. The instances that are in both polarities in the scope form the set of fixed instances. The remaining instances, that is, those ground instances of the predicate that are neither positively nor negatively contained in the scope, form the set of varied instances.
We now make precise how scope-determined circumscription relates to the established definition of predicate circumscription by means of second-order quantification (Lifschitz, 1994; Doherty et al., 1997; Gabbay et al., 2008) . We express the involved second-order quantification by projection, justified as follows: ∃p F can be expressed as project S (F ), where S is the set of all ground literals with a predicate other than p. From Prop. 7.xii it can be derived that also a smaller projection scope is sufficient: project S (F ) is equivalent to project S (F ) for all subsets S of S that contain those literals of S whose predicate symbols actually occur in F . The above-mentioned parallel circumscription traditionally written as CIRC[F ; P ; Z], which is equivalent to the sentence called second-order circumscription of P in F with variable Z in (Doherty et al., 1997; Gabbay et al., 2008) , can then be notated as the sentence circ-so(F, P, Z) specified as follows: Definition 14 (Second-Order Circumscription in Terms of Projection). Let F be a plain first-order sentence and let P = p 1 , . . . , p n and Z = z 1 , . . . , z m with n, m ≥ 0 be disjoint tuples of distinct predicate symbols that occur in F . Then circ-so(F, P, Z) is a sentence with the projection operator, defined as:
where Q is the set of ground literals whose predicate symbol occurs in F but is neither in P nor in Z, and F and P < P are defined as follows: Let P = p 1 , . . . , p n and Z = z 1 , . . . , z m be disjoint tuples of distinct predicate symbols such that members of P and P with the same index, as well as members of Z and Z with the same index, are of the same arity, and P and Z do not contain predicate symbols in F . Let F be the formula that is obtained from F by replacing each predicate symbol that is in P or Z by the predicate symbol with the same index in P or Z , respectively. For i ∈ {1, . . . , n} let x i stand for x 1 , . . . , x k , where k is the arity of predicate symbol p i . Finally, let P < P stand for
The Q parameter on the right side of Definition 14 represents the "fixed" predicate symbols. The set of literals P ∪Q suffices as projection scope to "forget about" P and Z , since the projected formula F ∧P < P , contains, aside of predicates symbols in P , Z , just predicates symbols that are in P or in Q. The following proposition states formally that second-order circumscription can be expressed with scope-determined circumscription.
Proposition 15 (Second-Order and Scope-Determined Circumscription). Let F be a plain first-order sentence and let P, Z be tuples of predicate symbols as specified in the definition of circ-so. Let Q be the set of predicate symbols in F that are neither in P nor in Z. Then circ-so(F, P, Z) ≡ circ (P ∩POS)∪Q (F ).
Pointwise circumscription (Lifschitz, 1986) can be expressed as conjunction over scopedetermined circumscriptions onto scopes of a specific form: If S is an atom scope and L is a positive literal in S, then the circumscription onto the scope S −{L} can be understood as circumscribing the "single point" L. If F is a sentence over disjoint sets of predicates P , Q and Z, then the pointwise counterpart to circ (P ∩POS)∪Q (F ) is L∈P ∩POS circ (P −L)∪Q (F ), where, to let the conjunction be finite, we assume that P has a finite set of ground instances.
Basic Properties of Scope-Determined Circumscription
The following proposition lists some properties of scope-determined circumscription that do not involve other logic operators and follow from its definition and properties of raising:
Proposition 16 (Basic Properties of Scope-Determined Circumscription).
A circumscription entails its argument formula (Prop. 16.i). Although not monotonic, circumscription is, like raising and projection, a "semantic operator" in the sense that for equivalent argument formulas its values are also equivalent (Prop. 16.ii). A circumscription entails the circumscription onto a superset scope, provided that its uniscope is a subset of the first scope (Prop. 16.iii). If this relationship holds between inner and outer scopes of nested circumscriptions, they collapse into a circumscription onto the inner scope (Prop. 16.iv). The circumscription onto an atom scope, or equivalently onto a scope with empty uniscope, is equivalent to the circumscribed formula (Prop. 16.v). The following facts about the interplay of scope-determined circumscription with disjunction and conjunction also follow from properties of raising:
Proposition 17 (Interplay of Circumscription with Disjunction and Conjunction).
The circumscription of a disjunction entails the disjunction of the circumscriptions of its disjuncts (Prop. 17.i). A conjunction of circumscriptions entails the circumscription of the conjunction of their circumscribed formulas (Prop. 17.ii).
Circumscriptions of Projections
The following proposition states properties of the circumscription operator wrapped around projection:
Proposition 18 (Circumscriptions of Projections).
A circumscription entails the circumscription of a projection onto a superset of the circumscription scope (Prop. 18.i). The circumscription of a projection, both onto the same scope, is equivalent to the circumscription onto this scope of the projection onto a possibly larger scope: The atom scope obtained as union of the scope and the set of complements of its members (Prop. 18.ii). In the special case where F ≡ project S∪S (F ), which holds if the circumscription scope S corresponds to predicate circumscription without varied predicates, the statement Prop. 18.ii is equivalent to
Predicate circumscription with fixed and varied predicates can be expressed in terms of predicate circumscription with just fixed predicates. This is rendered by equivalence (v) below in terms of scope-determined circumscription and atom projection. Let F be a sentence over disjoint sets of predicates P , Q and Z. As explained in Section 4.2, the parallel predicate circumscription of P in F with fixed Q and varied Z can then be expressed as the scope-determined circumscription circ (P ∩POS)∪Q (F ). By instantiating Prop. 18.iii with S = (P ∩ POS) ∪ Q and S = Z we obtain:
Proposition 18.iv shows a condition for equivalence preserving adjustments of the scopes of circumscriptions by adding or removing "irrelevant" literals. For example, let P, Q be disjoint sets of predicates and let F be a formula that is just over P . Then F ≡ project P (F ), and Prop. 18.iv can be instantiated with S p = P ∩ POS and S c = (P ∩ POS) ∪ Q to derive
An equivalence of the form
can be understood as a statement that F only expresses something about literals in S.
The equivalence of Prop. 18.v is of this form, specifying in this way a scope that includes all literals about which a circumscription does express something. The proposition can be read as stating that if the formula F which is going to be circumscribed is only about literals in S p , that is, if it holds that F ≡ project Sp (F ), then the scope S includes all literals about which the circumscription onto scope S c does express something. That is, the circumscription is equivalent to its projection onto S. Scope S is the union of three constituents:
(1) S p : Literals about which the formula to be circumscribed might express something.
(2) uniscope(S c ): Complements of literals in the uniscope of the circumscription scope. That is, complements of minimized or maximized literals. (3) biscope(S c )∩uniscope(S p ): Literals in the biscope of the circumscription scope whose complement is contained in the uniscope of S p . That is, literals which are fixed with respect to the circumscription, and about whose complement the circumscribed formula might express something (but does not express something about the literals themselves -such literals would already be included by item (1) in S).
These three constituents are illustrated by the following example:
= {+p, −q, +r}, and S c def = {+q, −q, +r, +s}. Then F ≡ project Sp (F ) and
By Prop. 18.v it holds that circ Sc (F ) ≡ project S (circ Sc (F )), where S = S p ∪uniscope(S c )∪ (biscope(S c ) ∩ uniscope(S p )). The three constituents of S then are
(1) S p = {+p, −q, +r}, (2) uniscope(S c ) = {−r, −s}, and
Their union is S = {+p, +q, −q, +r, −r, −s}. Since S is also the literal base of the right side of equivalence (viii), it follows from Prop. 7.xi that circ Sc (F ) ≡ project S (circ Sc (F )), as claimed by Prop. 18.v.
Well-Foundedness and Projections of Circumscriptions
As discussed in (Lifschitz, 1994) , circumscription can in general only be applied usefully to a formula F if all models of F extend some model of F that is minimal with respect to the circumscribed predicates. In the extreme case where no model of F extends a minimal one, that is, if for all models of F there exists another one that is strictly smaller with respect to the circumscribed predicates, the circumscription is unsatisfiable. The property well-founded, which holds for universal formulas, makes the required condition precise. As presented in (Lifschitz, 1994) , it is defined for circumscription of a single predicate p with varied predicates Z as follows (adapted to our notation): Let F be a plain first-order sentence, p be predicate symbol and Z be a tuple of predicate symbols. The sentence F is called well-founded with respect to (p, Z) if for every model I, β of F there exists a model J, β of circ-so(F, p , Z) such that I, β and J, β differ only in how they interpret p and Z and the extent of p in J, β is a (not necessarily strict) subset of its extent in I, β . We can convert this definition straightforwardly into our semantic framework: Let Q be the set of predicate symbols in F that are different from p and not in Z. The sentence F is then well-founded with respect to (p, Z) if for all interpretations I, β such that I, β |= F there exists an interpretation J, β such that
The project operator allows to express this definition compactly for scope-determined circumscription: Let S be the scope (p ∩ POS) ∪ Q. By Proposition 15, circ-so(F, p , Z) is equivalent to circ S (F ). Furthermore, given that I and J are structures and Q = Q, the conjunction of items (2) and (3) above is equivalent to J ∩ S ⊆ I. By contracting the definition of project (Definition 1), the statement that there exists an interpretation J, β satisfying items (1)-(3) can be expressed as
Accordingly, the following definition provides a compact characterization of wellfoundedness in terms of projection and scope-determined circumscription. It applies with respect to arbitrary scopes S, corresponding to variants of circumscription as indicated in Section 4.2:
Definition 20 (Well-Founded Formula). A formula F is called well-founded with respect to scope S if and only if F |= project S (circ S (F )).
The following proposition shows that for well-founded formulas the projection of a circumscription to a superset of the projection scope collapses to just the projection:
Proposition 21 (Projections of Circumscriptions). If F is well-founded with respect to S c and S p ⊆ S c , then
Globally Strongest Necessary and Weakest Sufficient Condition
The properties of consequences of circumscription that will be discussed in the subsequent section involve the application of projection according to two specific related patterns, defined as follows:
Definition 22 (Globally Strongest Necessary Condition). The globally strongest necessary condition of formula G on scope S within formula F , in symbols gwsc S (F, G), is defined as
Definition 23 (Globally Weakest Sufficient Condition). The globally weakest sufficient condition of formula G on scope S within formula F , in symbols gwsc S (F, G), is defined as
The following two propositions show alternate characterizations of these operators:
Proposition 24 (Alternate Characterization of gsnc). A formula H is equivalent to gsnc S (F, G) if and only if the following holds:
Proposition 25 (Alternate Characterization of gwsc). A formula H is equivalent to gwsc S (F, G) if and only if the following holds:
Globally strongest necessary condition and globally weakest sufficient condition are quite common patterns of the application of projection. For example, forms of abduction and notions of conservative theory extension can be expressed with instances of gwsc S (F ). These patterns are variants of strongest necessary condition and weakest sufficient condition, which have been devised in (Lin, 2001) for propositional logic and adapted to first-order logic in (Doherty et al., 2001) . The variants introduced here differ in several details, which we point out now for the globally strongest necessary condition. This applies analogously for the globally weakest sufficient condition. The following definition renders strongest necessary condition as defined in (Doherty et al., 2001 ):
Definition 26 (Strongest Necessary Condition). A strongest necessary condition of a formula G on a set of predicate symbols P under formula F is a formula H such that:
(1) H contains only predicate symbols from P . (2) F |= G → H.
(3) For all formulas H such that H contains only predicate symbols from P and
There are minor differences to the original definition which we neglect here: The F parameter is originally called a theory (seemingly referring to a set of formulas) instead of a formula. Also, the original definition introduces the additional intermediate concept sufficient condition for H satisfying conditions (1) and (2). The essential differences are the following:
(1) In the global variant a scope argument is used instead of a set of predicates to specify the symbols permitted in H. The involvement of scopes allows to constrain also the polarity in which predicates are allowed to occur in H. This feature is essential for Propositions 27.ii and 27.iii below. In addition, with scopes it can be specified that only particular instances of a predicate are allowed to occur in H. (2) The restriction on the vocabulary of H is expressed in the global variant by a semantic condition (H ≡ project S (H)), that is, a condition which is independent of syntactic properties of H. In contrast, the strongest necessary condition refers to the predicate symbols contained in H, a syntactic property. For propositional logic, this difference is neglectable, since if a formula H is known to satisfy H ≡ project S (H), a formula that is equivalent to H and only contains literals from S can always be constructed from H. (3) The consequents in the respective conditions (3) (Lin, 2001 , Example 1.3) shows this: Let F = {(q → p 1 ) ∧ q}, G = q and S = {p 1 }. Then formulas p 1 and are both strongest necessary conditions of G on S under F but clearly not equivalent. In contrast, the globally strongest necessary condition is unique up to equivalence, and strongest compared to any H satisfying the antecedent of condition (3) in Proposition 24, independently of F . Hence the prefix "globally" for the variants introduced here. Apparently, the only reason for basing the definition of strongest necessary condition on the relativized consequent F |= H → H is a property that facilitates a certain computation technique (Lin, 2001) . In (Doherty et al., 2001 ) both variants are not clearly distinguished: Strongest necessary condition with the relativized consequent is associated with a characterization in terms of second-order quantification that can be considered as instance of the globally strongest necessary condition.
Characterizing Consequences of Circumscription
Proposition 27 shows that a formula is a consequence of a circumscription if and only if -depending on the vocabulary of the formula -the formula itself, or a formula obtained by applying the globally strongest necessary and globally weakest sufficient condition is a consequence of the circumscribed formula:
Proposition 27 (Consequences of Circumscriptions).
(i) If F is well-founded with respect to S and
Propositions 27.i-27.iii differ by trading-off simplicity of the characterization against strength of the precondition that restricts the consequence formula. These propositions generalize and combine adaptions of propositions in (Lifschitz, 1994) and (Lang et al., 2003) : Proposition 27.ii and 27.iii are based on characterizations of the consequences of propositional circumscription in terms of literal forgetting given as Proposition 22 in (Lang et al., 2003) , an investigation of propositional literal forgetting. The statements given in (Lang et al., 2003) are generalized and made more precise here in the following respects:
(1) Proposition 27.ii and 27.iii apply to first-order logic. The precondition that F is well-founded has been added since it is required to show these propositions for first-order logic in general. Propositional formulas are always well-founded. (2) Preconditions that constrain the vocabulary of the consequences are expressed by statements G ≡ project S (G) and G ≡ project S∪S (G), in contrast to L(G) ⊆ S and L(G) ⊆ S ∪ S, respectively. The statements with the projection operator are independent of syntactic properties of G and more general than those which refer to the syntactic literal base. (3) Observing that projection is applied in patterns matching the globally strongest necessary and globally weakest sufficient condition, we apply these operators to express the properties more compactly. (4) A thorough proof is provided in the appendix. The proof given in (Lang et al., 2003) just shows the characterizations as straightforward consequence of (Przymusinski, 1989 , Theorems 2.5 and 2.6), for which in turn no proof is given, neither in (Przymusinski, 1989), nor in (Gelfond et al., 1986) which is referenced by (Przymusinski, 1989) . (5) With Proposition 27.i a third basic variant for consequents that are stronger restricted than in Prop. 27.ii is fitted in. This basic variant is actually a straightforward generalization of Proposition 12 in (Lifschitz, 1994) , which is introduced as capturing the intuition that, under the assumption of well-foundedness, a circumscription provides no new information about the fixed predicates, and only "negative" additional information about the circumscribed predicates.
Summary of Properties of Scope-Determined Circumscription
We conclude the presentation of scope-determined circumscription with Table 2 (p. 19) that displays the properties stated as propositions in the preceding sections all together at a single place.
Conclusion
We have introduced the raising operator which can be used to define circumscription in a compact way. The semantic definitions of literal projection and raising can be written such that they differ only in that a set inclusion symbol in the definition of literal projection is in place of a strict set inclusion symbol in the definition of raising. The raising operator has -aside of a formula -just a so-called scope, that is, a set of literals, as argument, such that, depending on the composition of this set, not only parallel circumscription with varied predicates can be expressed, but also minimization, maximization and variation conditions that apply only to a subset of the instances of a predicate. 
Circumscriptions of Projections
(18.i) If Sc ⊆ Sp, then circ Sc (F ) |= circ Sc (project Sp (F )).
(18.ii) circ S (project S (F )) ≡ circ S (project S∪S (F )).
Varied Predicates via Projection
(18.iii) If S ∩ S = ∅ and S = S , then circ S (F ) ≡ F ∧ circ S∪S (project S∪S (F )).
Equivalent Circumscription Scopes
(18.iv) If Sp ⊆ Sc and uniscope(Sp) = uniscope(Sc), then circ Sp (project Sp∪Sp (F )) ≡ circ Sc (project Sp∪Sp (F )).
Aboutness of Circumscription
(18.v) Let S def = Sp ∪ uniscope(Sc) ∪ (biscope(Sc) ∩ uniscope(Sp)). Then circ Sc (project Sp (F )) ≡ project S (circ Sc (project Sp (F ))).
Projections of Circumscriptions
(21) If F is well-founded with respect to Sc and Sp ⊆ Sc, then project Sp (circ Sc (F )) ≡ project Sp (F ).
Consequences of Circumscriptions
(27.i) If F is well-founded with respect to S and G ≡ project S (G), then circ S (F ) |= G iff F |= G. (27.ii) If F is well-founded with respect to S and G ≡ project S∪S (G), then circ S (F ) |= G iff F |= gsnc S (F, G). (27.iii) If F is well-founded with respect to S, then circ S (F ) |= G iff F |= gsnc S (F, gwsc S (F, G)).
The characterization of circumscription in terms of the raising operator is immediately useful to prove properties of circumscription in a streamlined way. Properties that involve circumscription together with projection can be straightforwardly expressed since operators for both are parametrized uniformly with scopes that can then be shared or related between operator occurrences. The introduced semantic framework, an extension of first-order logic by projection and raising, provides a basis for future research, including the further elaboration of common and differing properties of both operators, and the first-order based reconstruction of various knowledge representation techniques.
The detailed formalization with its relatively simple manageability at the symbolic level should facilitate mechanization, which can then be used to reason with machine support about combinations of projection and circumscription. For this, there are different approaches conceivable: First, on the "meta-level", by submitting the semantic definitions shown in this paper with the propositions as lemmas to a theorem prover, which is then used to derive further propositions or solve "object-level" tasks, application problems. Projection and circumscription can be processed by variants of secondorder quantifier elimination for which a variety of techniques is available (see e.g. Gabbay et al. (2008); Wernhard (2009b) ). Thus, a second approach would be the use a theorem prover that is extended by dedicated second-order quantifier elimination techniques. An approach for handling scopes which include only subsets of the ground atoms with a given predicate has been described in (Wernhard, 2004) . The third approach is to resort to propositional techniques. Adaptions of DPLL SAT solving techniques are, for example, available for Boolean variable elimination (Huang and Darwiche, 2005; Wernhard, 2009b) . In addition, recent SAT preprocessors involve variable elimination techniques (e.g. Heule et al. (2010) ). For some tasks that involve projection or circumscription also QBF or SAT solvers can be applied.
A prototype system based on propositional logic has been implemented to explore the approach to computational processing of logics by eliminating operators such as project, raise and circ (Wernhard, 2011) .
1 A macro feature allows the user to define additional operators like gwsc in terms of these. The core operation of the system is to take a formula with such operators and return an equivalent propositional formula where these operators are eliminated. Output formulas are simplified, and various functions for pretty printing them, for example to display their models, are provided. The system uses Prolog as an environment that allows to pass intermediate results through logic variables between its components. It includes features which facilitate the preparation of propositional encodings of applications by permitting compound terms as propositional atoms and providing support for schematic formula expansion. The system provides a uniform user interface that integrates a portfolio of embedded methods and external programs. By applying propositions presented in this paper, input formulas are rewritten such that suitable subproblems can be passed to external QBF or SAT solvers, or be handled by dedicated elimination procedures, which currently are implemented naively, adequate for small applications.
